1. In March 1997,
Sir Robert May, then Chief Scientific Adviser to the
Government and Head of the Office of Science and
Technology (OST), published Guidelines on The Use of
Scientific Advice in Policy Making.
2. The May
Guidelines were issued against a background of
heightened public concern about scientific advice to
Government. The scientific advisory system was not
new: scientists have been advising Government for
many years. But there was increasing concern about
the way it operated. In March 1996, ten years after
the first identification of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) and after ten years of
maintaining that it was safe to eat beef, the
Government acknowledged that BSE had probably been
transmitted to humans. There was widespread concern
that several expert advisory committees, over a
number of years, appeared to have failed to alert the
Government, or the public, to the risks of eating
beef. Worse, it was suspected that scientific
uncertainty had been covered up by politicians and
civil servants in order to prevent a food scare. The
scientific community was blamed too: science, and the
scientific advisory system, appeared to have failed
to protect the public. Something had gone seriously
wrong.
3. At the same time,
there was mounting concern about standards in public
life, on the one hand, and on the way in which
government quangos operated, on the other. The Nolan
Committee had felt the need to restate the general
principles which should underpin public life, and had
called on all public bodies to establish Codes of
Conduct.[9] Public confidence in the integrity of
Government was at a low ebb.
9. Scientific advice
to Government is under even greater scrutiny now than
it was in 1998. Public confidence in the efficacy,
and even the integrity, of the scientific advisory
system has been sadly eroded. Recent government
assurances on the safety of the MMR vaccine, for
example, which have been based on the views of the
overwhelming majority of scientific and medical
opinion, have met with widespread scepticism or
downright disbelief. Similarly, anxieties about the
use of depleted uranium have been fuelled by
suspicions about the scientific information available
to Government on its safety. There is now a climate
of public opinion which is distrustful of authority.
The Government, in its use of the scientific advisory
system, has to recognise this social change and
respond to meet it.
PART I - SCIENTIFIC
ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT
Sources of
scientific advice
THE COUNCIL FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
14. The Council for
Science and Technology is described by OST as
"the Government's premier advisory
body".[30] Its purpose is to advise the Prime
Minister on the strategic policies and framework for
Science and Technology in the UK. The Chief
Scientific Adviser acts as Deputy Chairman, and there
are currently 15 independent members drawn from
academia and industry. The full Council meets
quarterly with more frequent meetings held by
sub-groups. The new Council has to date published one
"annual report", in March 2000, on its work
in 1998-99, and three substantive reports:
a review of
Science and Technology matters across Government
(July 1999);
a report on
the exploitation of Science and Technology by UK
business (February 2000); and
a report on
Science Teachers (also February 2000).
Its website
publishes membership, work schedule, and minutes of
meetings.[31] The Council appears to be active, yet
its public profile remains low. It has attracted
little attention in even the technical/scientific
media. As we discuss in paragraph 44 below, it is
also unclear what influence the Council's reports
have had on government policy. We recommend that the
Government give more prominence to the activities of
the Council for Science and Technology and respond to
its recommendations.
THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC
ADVISER AND THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
15. The Government's
Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) is responsible for
advising the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on science
and technology matters, and for the quality of
scientific advice within Government. As Head of the
Office of Science and Technology he is responsible
for its transdepartmental functions, advising
Ministers and co-ordinating strategy on science and
technology matters across Government. In this, the
CSA is supported by the OST's Transdepartmental
Science and Technology Group (TDSTG).
16. Sir Robert May,
CSA since 1995, was replaced by Professor David King
in October 2000.
18. As we concluded
in our 2000 Report on Government Expenditure on
Research and Development: The Forward Look, "the
co-ordination role of the OST and the CSA should be
enhanced, with a more explicit remit to intervene,
where necessary, with departments".[35] It is
important that Ministers in all relevant Departments
should support the OST and strengthen it in its role
of co-ordinating science policy across Government.
CHIEF SCIENTISTS IN
DEPARTMENTS
20. A number of
Departments have their own Chief Scientist or
equivalent, whose role within their department is
analogous to that of the CSA - primarily to ensure
the quality and effectiveness of the research
commissioned by their department.[37] They also have
responsibility for ensuring that their Department's
procedures are consistent with OST guidelines.
Departmental chief scientists meet together regularly
as the Chief Scientific Adviser's Committee (CSAC),
with the CSA in the Chair. CSAC's remit is to discuss
Science, Engineering and Technology (SET) policy and
spread good practice; and also to provide advice to
Ministers, primarily through the Ministerial Science
Group.
21. As we stated in
our Report, "bureaucratic conventions about
lines of reporting should not stand in the way of
allowing Chief Scientist unfettered access to the CSA
on matters of departmental concern".[40] It is
essential that Chief Scientists in Departments should
have direct day-to-day access to the Chief Scientific
Adviser.
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF RESEARCH COUNCILS AND THE RESEARCH COUNCILS
22. The DGRC advises
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on the
allocation of the Science Budget to the seven
Research Councils [44] and sets the broad framework
within which the Research Councils decide what
science to fund and how. In setting this framework
the DGRC must ensure that the Government's existing,
and future, needs for scientific research and advice
are able to be met.
PUBLIC SECTOR
RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENTS
24. The Public
Sector Research Establishments (PSREs) are, in OST's
words, "a key element in the Government science
and technology advisory system".[46] There are
over 50 of these establishments, sponsored either by
the Research Councils or directly by Government
Departments.[47]
GOVERNMENT ADVISORY
COMMITTEES
26. The Government
also receives scientific advice from a wide variety
of departmental advisory bodies. These are committees
or groups of outside experts (and, in some cases,
civil servants) of many different kinds, and of
widely varying purpose. The OST's memoranda
distinguish three categories of advisory bodies:
those which
advise Government on the current state of play in
specific areas of science;
those which
advise Government on policy more generally but where
science and scientific advances are still a paramount
consideration or driver; and
those whose
work is primarily to science and technology support
programmes or its funding.[48]
27. Our inquiry has
focussed on the first category. The OST memorandum
lists over 50 of these scientific advisory
committees.[49] The largest number, 23[50], are
sponsored by DETR, which helpfully divides its
advisory committees into those advising on science at
a basic level; those building on advice, to provide a
risk analysis; and those building on advice and risk
analysis, to make policy recommendations.
STRATEGIC ADVISORY
BODIES
30. Since we began
our inquiry, the Government has created three new
"strategic" scientific advisory bodies:
the Human
Genetics Commission (HGC),
the Food
Standards Agency (FSA), and
the
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission
(AEBC).
Although often
grouped together, each of the three bodies has a
different status.[55] The HGC and AEBC are advisory
commissions established by the Department of Health
and the Cabinet Office (and the three devolved
administrations) respectively. The FSA, on the other
hand, is a non-Ministerial Government Department,
established by Act of Parliament: it has a statutory
basis and a range of executive functions, as well as
an advisory role. The status accorded different
advisory bodies at present appears haphazard.
31. The three new
bodies are not just committees of scientists: they
include in their membership journalists and
representatives of consumer, green and other interest
groups. They are therefore much more political, in
the widest sense, than traditional advisory
committees. Their role goes beyond assessment of the
science: they are to look at the "big
picture", taking ethical and social issues into
account, as well as the science.[57] All three bodies
have made a good start. They have made a point of
engaging with the public: the HGC, for example, has
recently held a public information-gathering and
discussion day on genetics and insurance. They have
adopted high standards of openness and transparency:
their easily accessible websites contains the minutes
of their meetings, registers of interests and
workplans.[58]
32. The Science and
Innovation White Paper states -
"These
Commissions face a challenging task, bringing
together widely difficult views on very difficult
issues and working under public view. If they are
successful, they will provide models for the future.
The Government will watch their work closely to see
what lessons can be translated into other
areas.".[59]
We welcome the new
strategic advisory bodies and, like the Government,
will be watching their work with interest. However,
it is essential that Ministers do not hide behind
these bodies on issues of policy, for it is Ministers
who are responsible for policy decisions.
INTERNATIONAL ADVICE
33. We welcome the
Government's assurance that it is working to ensure
that the principles underlying good scientific
decision making are adopted by international
bodies.[61] We support the recommendation of the
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee that
the Government should press for guidelines on
scientific advice across the board, along the lines
of the OST guidelines, to be adopted at European
Commission level.[62]
34. We reiterate the
recommendation made in our climate change case study
Report, that the Government actively promote the IPCC
[Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] model of
scientific advice in other policy areas of global
significance in which there is scientific
uncertainty.
35. Even where
policy is being decided within the UK, it may well be
useful to obtain advice from abroad. We are fortunate
that the UK science base is broad, but there is often
much to be gained from a wider perspective; and
international involvement may increase public
confidence in the advice provided. The Government
should make full use of scientific experience abroad,
and include experts from abroad on advisory
committees, where appropriate. This has rarely been
the case in the past.
THE LEARNED BODIES
36. The OST's
memorandum states that "the Government works
closely with a range of other organisations as
appropriate", including the Learned Bodies (the
Royal Society, the Royal Academy of Engineering, the
Professional Institutions etc) and independent bodies
of experts (for example, the Standing Committee on
Structural Safety).[65] The Learned Bodies, however,
think that the Government fails to pay them
sufficient attention. The Royal Society recommended
that "the Government should make much more use
of independent, external sources of advice", and
pointed out that advice from "independent bodies
of international reputation ... brings with it the
endorsement of internationally recognised
peers".[67]
37. In our view, the
Learned Bodies are an invaluable source of
authoritative scientific advice, and it is surprising
that Government Departments appear not to consult
them as a matter of routine. They are particularly
well-placed to advise on the selection of scientists
to serve on advisory committees, and to advise which
disciplines it would be appropriate to include.
39. The Learned
Bodies and professional institutions regularly act
proactively to produce reports on subjects they
regard as important and of interest to policymakers.
Government must take proper account of these reports
- and be seen to be taking account of them. We note
that the Home Affairs Committee has recently elicited
and published a full response from the Home Office to
the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1971 (the Runciman Report).[72] We
should be pleased to act similarly, if circumstances
require it. Government should be aware that we will
consider using our powers to insist on a memorandum
from the Government responding in full to the
recommendations made in reports by the Learned
Bodies.
40. Involving the
Learned Bodies more closely in the scientific
advisory system would be a straightforward way of
demonstrating its independence.
The Government's
role
IDENTIFYING THE NEED
FOR ADVICE
4. All advisory
committees should be allowed to operate more
proactively, monitoring developments in scientific
research in their field and alerting the Government
to relevant change.
42. A key issue for
Government is to ensure that there is a sound
research base on which advice can be based. In all
our case studies we have found that there are serious
gaps in research.[75] We have also found that where
issues cross departmental boundaries - as they do on
GM foods, mobile phones and climate change, for
example - there is frequently inadequate
co-ordination of the research being commissioned by
the different Departments, and insufficient
cross-fertilisation of ideas. We welcome the
Government's commitment to joined-up work and policy
development, and its proposal "to use increased
openness to help identify areas of potential weakness
in the research map".[76] It is vital that
research is adequately co-ordinated, and that any
gaps in research needed to inform policy are
identified and addressed, with funding made
available. The research programme must do more than
meet policymakers' current needs for information: it
must try to anticipate the advice required in future
years.
43. Of course,
anticipating the needs of policymakers years ahead is
far from easy. Departments must ensure that they have
enough well-qualified science and engineering
personnel in-house who are in touch with their
professional communities. Departments should also
encourage the Research Councils and the Learned
Bodies to provide them with foresight of potential
scientific developments. And it should be made clear
in the terms of reference of advisory bodies that it
is their role to look ahead and advise Departments of
issues which may face policymakers in years ahead.
ASSESSING ADVICE
44. It also falls to
Government to assess the advice it receives. One of
the lessons identified in the Phillips Report is that
"Departments should retain "in house"
sufficient expertise to ensure that the advice of
advisory committees, and the reasoning behind it, can
be understood and evaluated".[77] The Government
must take steps to ensure that there is sufficient
scientific expertise within the civil service, so
that Departments may be "intelligent
customers" and have the capacity to interpret
and understand the advice they receive.
45. The Phillips
Report recommends that advice should normally be in
writing, in terms that can be understood by a
layperson, should state the reasons for conclusions
and any underlying assumptions, and where appropriate
should set out the different policy options and the
implications of each.[80] It is incumbent on advisory
bodies to present their advice in a way which is
clear and comprehensible, while identifying any
uncertainty and dissent as well as their consensus
view.
USING ADVICE IN
POLICY-MAKING
46. The purpose of
the scientific advisory system is to inform the
Government of scientific matters relevant to policy
decisions. How Government uses advice in
policy-making is therefore a test of the
effectiveness of the scientific advisory system.
Scientific
uncertainty and the precautionary principle
47. A central issue
for Government is how it handles scientific
uncertainty and risk. This has been a recurring theme
in our inquiry, and is one of the central issues of
the Phillips Report. The House of Lords Science and
Technology Committee, in its Report on Science and
Society, addressed the problem of communicating
uncertainty and risk, and concluded that there were
no easy answers.[82] In our climate change Report, we
commend the formula for expressing degrees of
uncertainty which is adopted in the IPCC's summaries
for policymakers, and suggest that this could
usefully be adopted by other advisory bodies.[83] We
believe that the public is well able to understand
uncertainties, if they are clearly presented.
48. When faced with
scientific uncertainty, the Government may be
required to apply the precautionary principle. In the
Government's words, the precautionary principle
"holds that absence of scientific proof should
not delay or prevent proportionate measures to remove
or reduce threats of serious harm".[84] The
precautionary principle, or approach, is frequently
applied by policymakers. Sadly, the precautionary
principle was not applied by Government in relation
to policy on BSE. As the Phillips Report finds,
"the importance of precautionary measures should
not be played down on the grounds that the risk is
unproved". We welcome the Government's
commitment to applying the precautionary principle
where appropriate.[85] We recognise, however, that
whether to apply the precautionary principle in a
particular case is essentially a political decision,
and rightly the responsibility of elected Ministers.
While scientists can offer useful advice about the
magnitude of the risks involved, public opinion plays
a major part in persuading Government to apply - or
not to apply - the precautionary principle.
49. Firmly linked to
the precautionary principle, however, is a principle
of proportionality. The Government should take that
action which is proportionate to the risk. In its
Interim Response to the Phillips Report, the
Government states that its approach is "to make
available to the public sufficient information about
a risk, in a form that is easily understood, so that
individuals can make their own choices"; but
that where "the risks are taken involuntarily,
affect vulnerable groups, such as children, or where
the hazard is widespread the public expects
government to ensure that measures are in place to
protect them". The Government acknowledges that
"a balance needs to be struck between
intervening too much ... and failing to help protect
them sufficiently from actual or potential
hazards".[86] In our Diabetes Report, for
example, we concluded that the outright ban on
insulin-treated diabetics from driving heavier road
vehicles was an unjustifiably severe application of
the precautionary principle.[87] The Government must
ensure that its response is proportionate to the
potential threat. The Minister for Science, through
the Chief Scientific Adviser, should ensure that the
precautionary principle is properly understood, and
applied where appropriate, across Government.
Intragovernmental
co-ordination
50. In a number of
areas we have found that communication of advice
between Government Departments, and even within
Departments, is inadequate. The Government must
ensure that scientific advice is disseminated
effectively amongst policymakers.
PART IIQUALITY
OF AND CONFIDENCE IN SCIENTIFIC ADVICE
Establishing the
quality of advice
51. The Government
has to establish that the advice it receives is of a
high quality. It has to ensure that its sources of
advice are good and operate effectively, and it has
to have ways of checking that the advice it receives
is valid.
52. The most
effective way of ensuring the validity of advice is
to open the advice to peer review. Peer review may be
formal - by asking other experts to review the advice
- or informal, for example by opening the advice to
public scrutiny. It is important to ensure that
formal peer review is independent and rigorous. There
is a risk that reviewers may be too close to those
they are reviewing to be critical or to offer a
significantly different perspective. This may be
regarded by a hostile public as incestuous. It is,
therefore, important that formal peer review be
supplemented by wider scrutiny. Many advisory
committees are already in the practice of publishing
their advice to Government, and the commitment to
transparency for all advisory committees will
facilitate scrutiny greatly. But for this wider
scrutiny to be effective the Government must offer
clear channels for scientists of other disciplines to
offer their alternative perspective.
53. A key question
in our inquiry has been whether the Government is
sufficiently aware of those independent scientists
whose views diverge from the profession's mainstream:
dissident or even maverick voices. It should be the
clear responsibility of advisory committees to draw
dissenting views to the attention of Government.
54. One of the
difficulties for Government is to establish whether
an approach is coming from a sensible, if dissident,
scientist, or simply from someone who is peddling an
unsubstantiated view. We have seen examples where
scientists have been manipulated by the media, who
have given quite disproportionate and uncritical
coverage to their research. Scientists who are unused
to media attention may be seduced to voice views way
beyond their scientific knowledge. Government must
ensure that dissident scientists are heard, but not
give credence to those who, with media encouragement,
are voicing unsubstantiated theories.
Public confidence
55. There is no
doubt that there has been a loss of public confidence
in the scientific advisory system. This is only
partly a reflection on the scientific advisory system
itself: it is part of a wider public distrust of the
political process and possibly a decline in respect
for authority. As we stated in paragraph 9, the
Government, in its use of the scientific advisory
system, must recognise this social change and respond
to it. Public opinion plays a major part in forming
Government policy, whatever the scientific advice.
New developments need to have public support. It was
public opinion, not scientific advice, which led to
policy changes on GM foods, for example. Restoring
public confidence in scientific advice is essential,
but it will be a hard, and slow, process.
Openness and
transparency
56. The Phillips
Report sets out three simple lessons:
"- To establish
credibility it is necessary to generate trust
- Trust can only be
generated by openness
- Openness requires
recognition of uncertainty, where it
exists".[90]
These lessons are
strongly endorsed in the Government's Interim
Response. This states that the Government is
committed to a policy of open and transparent
working, and recognises that efforts to "build
and sustain trust through openness cannot succeed
unless it is fully prepared to acknowledge
uncertainty in its assessments of risk".[91] The
Guidelines 2000 emphasise that Department's
procedures for obtaining advice should be open and
transparent; and the draft Code of Practice expects
advisory bodies to maintain high levels of
transparency during routine business and to publish
appropriate documents explaining their activities. We
commend the very significant steps which Government
is making to increase openness and transparency.
57. The Government's
commitment to transparency is very welcome. We note
that there are limitations to this commitment. The
Government was not prepared to extend the provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act to factual
information made available to Ministers. The draft
Code of Practice envisages that in some circumstances
the advice of advisory bodies will not be published.
Voluntary disclosure is not enough, if the public is
to be convinced that the scientific advisory system
is truly transparent. We note with approval the
proposal in the Government's Interim Report that
there should be a centrally run website providing
access to information about publicly-funded R&D
programmes.[92] In addition to, or perhaps part of,
this, we recommend that there should be a website for
the scientific advisory system, with direct links to
every advisory committee.
The role of the
media
58. Efforts to
sustain public confidence in the scientific advisory
system are not assisted by the inaccurate or
sensational reporting of scientific matters in the
media. In our case study on GM foods, we were very
concerned by the quality of media coverage of GM
issues. We recommended that there be a Code of
Practice governing media coverage of scientific
matters, and that breaches be referred to the Press
Complaints Commission.[93] In its response, the
Government maintained that the newspaper industry's
existing Code of Practice covered alleged inaccuracy
in reporting, regardless of the subject matter, and
that the BBC's guidelines and the ITC's Programme
Code required accuracy of reporting in the
broadcasting media. The Government saw no merit in a
separate code for scientific matters.[94] We note
that the Royal Society has produced guidelines for
editors, calling for factual accuracy and balance in
media coverage of science. We endorse the
recommendation of the House of Lords Select Committee
that the Press Complaints Commission should adopt and
promulgate the Royal Society's guidelines for
editors.[95]
59. The role of the
media has been explored in depth by the House of
Lords Committee in its Report on Science and Society.
We commend this Report to the scientists and
journalists. While we continue to believe that
inaccurate and unbalanced reporting is unacceptable,
we note the Lords Committee's conclusion that
scientists must learn to work with the media as they
are. Scientists must learn to communicate better and
to present their case to the media.
PART IIITHE
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY SYSTEM
Operation of the
advisory committees
60. As the Science
and Innovation White Paper states -
"Expert
scientific advisory committees are absolutely
essential to our society. Without the knowledge and
wisdom of the people who give up their time to serve
on them, we would not be able to identify or manage
the risks from science, or gain the benefits of
scientific advances. We all owe them a debt of
gratitude."[96]
TERMS OF REFERENCE
61. It is essential
that all scientific advisory bodies should have clear
terms of reference. As the Phillips Report states,
"the areas of advice that are required from the
advisory committee should be identified as precisely
as possible before the committee is set up" and
"consideration should be given at the outset to
the manner in which the committee will contribute to
deciding policy".[97] It must be clear whether
committees are simply to advise on the science, or
whether they are also to advise on the policy
options. It must also be clear where the limits of
their responsibility, in the latter context, lies.
62. We are concerned
that the distinction between risk assessment
(properly the role of advisory committees) and risk
management (principally the responsibility of
Departments) seems frequently to be blurred. We note
that the new strategic advisory bodies have
responsibility for both: they advise and they
recommend policy, although ultimate decision-making
remains with Ministers. Some of the advisory
committees too are asked to advise on policy options.
As Phillips notes, "if a committee is asked to
advise which policy option to adopt, there may be
little alternative but to follow that
advice".[98] Whatever the role of the advisory
body, it must be clear that responsibility for
decision-making lies with the Department, and that
accountability for these decisions lies with
Ministers. Advisory bodies must not be used as a
device by Ministers to shirk difficult policy
decisions.
63. We welcome the
commitment by the Government to improve both risk
assessment and risk management procedures. The
Government has established an Inter-departmental
Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA).[99] The
Treasury has recently published a broad framework for
managing risk ("the Orange Book"[100]),
which sets out the principles of good risk
management. The Government recognises that guidance
alone will not be enough, and that officials will
need to be thoroughly trained in its application.
Advisory committees will also need clear guidance.
The Phillips Report found that "where a
committee is asked to advise on risk management, it
will normally be helpful to follow a formal structure
based on recognised principles of risk
assessment".[101] The Government has agreed that
this should be made clear in the Code of
Practice.[102]
RECRUITMENT
64. Since 1998,
appointments to advisory committees have been subject
to the Public Appointments Code. This is very
welcome. As Phillips has stated, advisory committees
should include experts in the areas of the advice
that is likely to be required. This may seem
self-evident but it has not always been the case. It
is not always clear, particularly to the
non-specialist, exactly which disciplines will be
relevant, and this may change over time. The Royal
Society of Chemistry felt that "governments have
an incomplete view as to whom it is appropriate to
consult on a given issue, which may be based on an
insufficient appreciation of the interdisciplinary
nature of modern science".[105] The Guidelines
must stress the importance of including all relevant
disciplines on advisory committees, and the Learned
Bodies could give invaluable advice here.
LAY MEMBERS
68. There have been
lay members on some advisory committees for many
years. Our case studies have convinced us of their
value. As the Phillips Report states, "a lay
member can play a vital role on an expert committee,
and in particular can ensure that advice given by the
committee addresses the concerns of, and is in a form
that is intelligible to, the public".[109] The
Government has stated that it agrees with this
finding.[110]
69. There is some
uncertainty about the definition of the term
"lay member". It does not necessarily mean
a non-scientist; indeed, some scientific background
may be very useful. The Guidelines 2000 state rather
vaguely that, in obtaining advice, Departments might
draw on "lay members of advisory groups,
consumer groups and other stakeholder bodies".
The Guidelines should clarify that "lay
members" can include scientists of other
disciplines.
70. We recommend
that the norm be for at least two lay members
(depending on the size of the committee) to be
appointed to scientific advisory committees. The
Guidelines should make this explicit.
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
71. Our case studies
have also convinced us of the importance of involving
scientists working for industry in advising
Government, even when they may have a financial
interest in the matter in which their advice is
sought. In our GM report, we rejected the suggestion
that employees of biotechnology or food companies
should be barred from serving on GM advisory
committees, and stated that "It is vital that
appointments to scientific advisory committees should
continue to be made by selecting people with the most
suitable and relevant expertise".[116]
72. We recommend
that the revised Guidelines require all advisory
committees to publish registers of members'
interests.
73. It is not only
those employed by industry who may have commercial
interests: academic and public sector scientists may
well have links to commercial organisations, or even
be dependent on them for funding. The revised
Guidelines should make clear that the requirement to
declare interests extends to those in all sectors.
COMMITTEE
SECRETARIATS
75. It is important
for the effectiveness of advisory committees that
they be properly staffed. In most cases, advisory
committees are staffed by a small secretariat of
civil servants drawn from the sponsoring
Department(s), and located within the Department.
While this may give rise to questions as to their
independence, it allows good communication between
the Department and the committee. The Phillips Report
found that "it will often be desirable to draw
the secretariat from the commissioning Department(s)
in order to provide a two-way channel of
communication". It noted, however, that
"the secretariat must be careful to respect the
independence of the committee".[123] We welcome
the Government's undertaking that these concerns will
specifically be taken into account when the next
draft of the Code of Practice is issued.[124] While
we accept that close links with the Department
concerned can be useful, we suggest that it would be
beneficial for at least some of a committee's staff
to be brought in from outside (for example, on
secondment from the Research Councils or the Learned
Bodies). It is essential that the staff of an
advisory committee appreciate that they work for the
committee and not for the Department.
76. In our GM
inquiry, we were concerned by the evidence of the
Chairman of ACRE that insufficient resources and
staff were allocated to the support of his committee,
and that this was causing "serious
problems". We recommended that the Government
looked closely at the staffing arrangements for
scientific advisory committees and committed itself
to providing large enough secretariats to ensure
their efficient working.[125] The Government does not
appear to have reviewed the staffing arrangements
more generally, as we recommended. In our current
inquiry into Genetics and Insurance, we have been
told by a member of the former Human Genetics
Advisory Commission that its staff resources were
"barely adequate" and that on occasion this
caused difficulty for members.[127] We believe this
to be a widespread and continuing problem. We
recommend that the Government ask each advisory
committee to report on the adequacy of its resources,
and to make a case for an increase, if they think
this necessary. Advisory committees must have the
resources they require to operate effectively.
Rationalisation of
committees
77. It is clear from
the OST's list of advisory committees, that a lot of
committees have grown up over the years, and that
they are not in any rational pattern. We believe that
the usefulness of a committee should be reviewed, by
an external body, at least every five years. If there
is no longer a clear need for a committee, it should
be disbanded. In addition, we believe there is a need
for a review of the whole network of advisory
committees to establish whether there is any overlap
or duplication which suggests the need for
rationalisation. We recommend that the Government
carry out a review of the advisory committee network
and thereafter establish a system of five-yearly
reviews for individual committees.
Impact of change in
Public Sector Research Establishments
78. As we discussed
in paragraph 25 above, the PSREs have been subject to
increased competition for funding. It has to be said
that, in this inquiry, we have encountered little
evidence of significant problems so far. It is too
soon to say how the research base, or the scientific
advisory system, has been affected by the moves to
encourage commercialisation in the Public Sector
Research Establishments.
79. It is in our
view unsatisfactory for the Government to be
dependent for advice on just one source of advice,
particularly if that source of advice is not
perceived to be independent of Government. The
Government must avoid dependence on single sources of
advice.
LIST OF
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
4. The OST should be
more active in encouraging consistency of standards
in science policy across Whitehall. ... It is
important that Ministers in all relevant Departments
should support the OST and strengthen it in its role
of co-ordinating science policy across Government.
(Paragraph 18)
6. It is essential
that Chief Scientists in Departments should have
direct day-to-day access to the Chief Scientific
Adviser. (Paragraph 21)
7. We recommend that
Government publish an annual list of scientific
advisory committees, with details of membership
(including registered interests) and terms of
reference, perhaps in the annual report on the
implementation of the Guidelines. (Paragraph 29)
10. The Government
should press for guidelines on scientific advice
across the board, along the lines of the OST
guidelines, to be adopted at European Commission
level. (Paragraph 33)
11. We reiterate the
recommendation made in our climate change case study
Report, that the Government actively promote the IPCC
model of scientific advice in other policy areas of
global significance in which there is scientific
uncertainty. (Paragraph 34)
12. The Government
should make full use of scientific experience abroad,
and include experts from abroad on advisory
committees, where appropriate. This has rarely been
the case in the past. (Paragraph 35)
14. The Government
must allow a reasonable time for outside bodies to
respond to consultation. Furthermore, to demonstrate
that the consultation has been genuine, we recommend
that the Government adopt the practice of publishing
a summary of the results of consultation. (Paragraph
38)
15. Government
should be aware that we will consider using our
powers to insist on a memorandum from the Government
responding in full to the recommendations made in
reports by the Learned Bodies. (Paragraph 39)
16. The Government
could also commission reports from the Learned
Bodies, where appropriate. (Paragraph 40)
17. Involving the
Learned Bodies more closely in the scientific
advisory system would be a straightforward way of
demonstrating its independence. (Paragraph 40)
18. If advisory
committees are not asked the right questions,
important scientific information may never be brought
to the Government's attention. ... All advisory
committees should be allowed to operate more
proactively, monitoring developments in scientific
research in their field and alerting the Government
to relevant change. (Paragraph 41)
19. It is vital that
research is adequately co-ordinated, and that any
gaps in research needed to inform policy are
identified and addressed, with funding made
available. The research programme must do more than
meet policymakers' current needs for information: it
must try to anticipate the advice required in future
years. (Paragraph 42)
20. It should be
made clear in the terms of reference of advisory
bodies that it is their role to look ahead and advise
Departments of issues which may face policymakers in
years ahead. (Paragraph 43)
21. The Government
must take steps to ensure that there is sufficient
scientific expertise within the civil service, so
that Departments may be "intelligent
customers" and have the capacity to interpret
and understand the advice they receive. (Paragraph
44)
22. It is incumbent
on advisory bodies to present their advice in a way
which is clear and comprehensible, while identifying
any uncertainty and dissent as well as their
consensus view. (Paragraph 45)
23. We believe that
the public is well able to understand uncertainties,
if they are clearly presented. (Paragraph 47)
24. We welcome the
Government's commitment to applying the precautionary
principle where appropriate. ... Whether to apply the
precautionary principle in a particular case is
essentially a political decision, and rightly the
responsibility of elected Ministers. While scientists
can offer useful advice about the magnitude of the
risks involved, public opinion plays a major part in
persuading Government to apply - or not to apply -
the precautionary principle. (Paragraph 48)
25. The Government
must ensure that its response is proportionate to the
potential threat. The Minister for Science, through
the Chief Scientific Adviser, should ensure that the
precautionary principle is properly understood, and
applied where appropriate, across Government.
(Paragraph 49)
26. The Government
must ensure that scientific advice is disseminated
effectively amongst policymakers. (Paragraph 50)
27. The Government
must offer clear channels for scientists of other
disciplines to offer their alternative perspective.
(Paragraph 52)
28. We repeat the
recommendation made in our report on Climate Change,
that clear and transparent channels should be
available through which scientists who hold
dissenting views can readily communicate their ideas
to policymakers and can have confidence that they
have been heard. It should be the clear
responsibility of advisory committees to draw
dissenting views to the attention of Government.
(Paragraph 53)
29. Government must
ensure that dissident scientists are heard, but not
give credence to those who, with media encouragement,
are voicing unsubstantiated theories. (Paragraph 54)
30. There is no
doubt that there has been a loss of public confidence
in the scientific advisory system. ... Restoring
public confidence in scientific advice is essential,
but it will be a hard, and slow, process. (Paragraph
55)
31. We commend the
very significant steps which Government is making to
increase openness and transparency. (Paragraph 56)
32. Voluntary
disclosure is not enough, if the public is to be
convinced that the scientific advisory system is
truly transparent. (Paragraph 57)
33. We recommend
that there should be a website for the scientific
advisory system, with direct links to every advisory
committee. (Paragraph 57)
35. We endorse the
recommendation of the House of Lords Select Committee
that the Press Complaints Commission should adopt and
promulgate the Royal Society's guidelines for
editors. (Paragraph 58)
36. Scientists must
learn to communicate better and to present their case
to the media. (Paragraph 59)
37. The advisory
committees do an enormous amount of valuable work,
for little or no reward. We firmly believe that the
advice which they give to Government is for the most
part of a very high quality. Significant improvements
have been made in recent years in the way they
operate. Implementation of the new Code of Practice
will improve matters further. (Paragraph 60)
38. Whatever the
role of the advisory body, it must be clear that
responsibility for decision-making lies with the
Department, and that accountability for these
decisions lies with Ministers. Advisory bodies must
not be used as a device by Ministers to shirk
difficult policy decisions. (Paragraph 62)
39. We welcome the
commitment by the Government to improve both risk
assessment and risk management procedures. (Paragraph
63)
40. The Guidelines
must stress the importance of including all relevant
disciplines on advisory committees, and the Learned
Bodies could give invaluable advice here. (Paragraph
64)
43. It should be
clear that the role of the lay member is to bring an
alternative perspective to the committee and not to
represent an interest group. ... The Guidelines
should clarify that "lay members" can
include scientists of other disciplines. (Paragraph
69)
44. We recommend
that the norm be for at least two lay members
(depending on the size of the committee) to be
appointed to scientific advisory committees. The
Guidelines should make this explicit. (Paragraph 70)
45. While an
interest should not be a bar to membership, there
should be clear guidelines for disclosure. (Paragraph
72)
46. We recommend
that the revised Guidelines require all advisory
committees to publish registers of members'
interests. (Paragraph 72)
47. The revised
Guidelines should make clear that the requirement to
declare interests extends to those in all sectors.
(Paragraph 73)
48. We welcome the
Government's commitment to a policy of appointments
being limited to five years, and being renewable only
once. (Paragraph 74)
50. It is essential
that the staff of an advisory committee appreciate
that they work for the committee and not for the
Department. (Paragraph 75)
51. We recommend
that the Government ask each advisory committee to
report on the adequacy of its resources, and to make
a case for an increase, if they think this necessary.
Advisory committees must have the resources they
require to operate effectively. (Paragraph 76)
52. We recommend
that the Government carry out a review of the
advisory committee network and thereafter establish a
system of five-yearly reviews for individual
committees. (Paragraph 77)
54. The Government
must avoid dependence on single sources of advice.
(Paragraph 79)
CONCLUSION
81. It is clear from
the Phillips Report, and from our own case studies,
that all is not well with the scientific advisory
system. Many improvements have been made, but much
remains to be done. Much of the scientific advice
delivered to Government is excellent - and we pay
tribute to those who provide it - but faults, in the
way that the advisory committees are set up, staffed
and operate, mean that it is not always as good as it
needs to be. The Government does not always seek
advice when it needs it, nor ask the right questions.
It is not always effective in assessing the advice
when it gets it, and does not always apply that
advice in policy-making. The distinction between the
role of scientific advisory bodies and Government
Departments in policy-making is not always clear-cut.
These are systemic problems which must be addressed.
We welcome the Government's constructive response to
the BSE inquiry and acknowledge the very real
progress which has been made, particularly in
openness and transparency. But there is still some
institutional complacency, and a misplaced belief
that the problem lies with public perception rather
than with the structure and use of the scientific
advisory system itself. Reform of the scientific
advisory system is required if public confidence is
to be restored.
[Background]
The Science and
Technology Committee is appointed to examine on
behalf of the House of Commons the expenditure,
administration and policy of the Office of Science
and Technology (and any associated public bodies).
Its constitution and powers are set out in House of
Commons Standing Order No. 152.
The present
membership of the Committee is as follows:[1]
Dr Michael Clark MP (Conservative, Rayleigh)[2]
Sir Paddy Ashdown MP (Liberal Democrat, Yeovil)[3]
Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas, (Labour, Crosby)[2]
Dr Ian Gibson MP (Labour, Norwich North)[2]
Dr Brian Iddon MP (Labour, Bolton South East)[4]
Mr Robert Jackson MP (Conservative, Wantage)[5]
Dr Lynne Jones MP (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak)[2]
Dr Ashok Kumar MP (Labour, Middlesborough South and
East Cleveland)[2]
Mr Ian Taylor MP (Conservative, Esher and Walton)[6]
Dr Desmond Turner MP (Labour, Brighton Kemptown)[2]
Dr Alan W Williams MP (Labour, Carmarthen East and
Dinefwr)[2]
All correspondence
should be addressed to
The Clerk of the Science and Technology Committee,
Committee Office, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA.
The telephone number for general inquiries is: 020
7219 2794;
the Committee's e-mail address is: scitechcom@parliament.uk